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conomic integration means liberalizing the rules which govern the
movement of goods and production factors by distinguishing between
two groups of countries: those which are party to the agreement and
those which are not. This discrimination might generate an ambiguous
final outcome, in the sense that trade may be more or less open than pre-
viously. Integrating entails becoming exposed to more competition from
the output of another »club member,« while possibly creating more pro-
tectionism against the output of a third party which has not signed the
treaty. This phenomenon makes it particularly rewarding to study trade
liberalization in the context of an economic integration process.
Countries which decide to integrate and grant each other preferential
treatment usually belong to a particular geographical and/or cultural re-
gion, which is why agreements of this kind tend to be classified as region-
alist. During the 1990s, regionalism spread as a strategy by means of
which economic globalization could unfold. Regional Trade Agreements
(rtas) proliferated rapidly during that decade, growing from around
50 in the early 1990s to 215 in 2003. By 2007 the number is expected to
reach 300 (omc, 2003). There are various explanations for this phenom-
enon: for example, multilateralism as a mechanism for advancing the re-
ciprocal, non-discriminatory liberalization of trade was showing signs of
wear (Krugman, 1991), and regionalism is a strategic response to discrim-
ination imposed by others (Baldwin, 1996).
This paper does not set out to explore the broader motives behind this
new wave of regionalism. Rather, it seeks to draw on the ideas reflected
in the abundant literature on the topic to describe the genesis and evolu-
tion of a specific trade bloc: the Mercado Común del Sur (mercosur).1
This bloc stands out as an ambitious agreement by four countries of the
South (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) to achieve economic
1. See, inter alia, Frankel (1997); De Melo and Panagariya (1993); World Bank (2000);
bid (2002).
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integration. Drawing on this case, the article will offer some general re-
flections on integration paths for economies of the South and propose a
number of general arguments to explain the perceived incentives which
encourage nations to opt for integration.
Birth of an Ambitious Project22
In the international economy, most trade takes place between neighbors
or within regions. There are patterns of specialization and models of be-
havior that have been verified empirically and explain why neighboring
economies manifest the closest trading links. Shorter distances, contigu-
ity, a common language, cultural patterns, and relatively similar stages of
development account for much of the relative intensity of commerce be-
tween neighbors. All these factors apply within mercosur. The mem-
bers are geographically close with shared borders, remote from the rest
of the world, with not dissimilar levels of development. These economies
constitute what is known as a natural trade bloc. If these countries were
to liberalize their trade, they would trade more with each other whether
or not they applied a discriminatory trade policy towards the rest of the
world (integration policies). There is evidence in the region to corrobo-
rate these statements. However, if this is the case – if the same thing
would happen »naturally« simply by opening up trade – why do they
need integration agreements? The advantage of an agreement is that it
ensures access to each other’s markets on a reciprocal basis. Besides, eco-
nomic integration permits the development of a framework for coopera-
tion which can become an essential ingredient in the economic develop-
ment of member countries. 
Regional integration in the Southern Cone of America has taken place
against a backdrop of two processes which are worth recalling here. The
first is the revival of regionalism or economic integration (reciprocal and
discriminatory trade liberalization) in the early 1990s as an alternative to
the multilateral format of trade liberalization (reciprocal and non-dis-
criminatory). The second process is a shift in how all Southern Cone
economies have pursued growth, from a model founded on import sub-
2. For a detailed description and evaluation of the trade agreement, its content, legal
framework and institutional structure, see Secretaría del mercosur (2004).
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stitution to one based on opening up their trade. The regional agreement
was created as an instrument to facilitate, jointly determine and drive the
integration of these economies as the international economy entered a
new stage of globalization. The biggest change was witnessed by the Bra-
zilian economy, which opened unilaterally and more fundamentally from
the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s. The integration agreement
analyzed here should be seen within the context of this shift in paradigm,
for it was intended to support and consolidate the unilateral strategy of
liberalization which all economies in the region were embarking upon,
albeit at different speeds.
The integration agreement was intended to support and consolidate 
the unilateral strategy of liberalization which all economies in the region 
were embarking upon, albeit at different speeds.
Over a decade after the Treaty of Asunción of March 1991, the found-
ing moment of mercosur, both processes – regionalism and liberaliza-
tion – are again acutely topical. Regionalism has been established in the
international economy as one approach to liberalization. The paradigm
is illustrated most clearly by the eu, where momentum is being main-
tained with regard to both deepening and widening. Two examples suf-
fice: the common currency and Eastern enlargement. At the same time,
the multilateral strategy is once again provoking a degree of skepticism
due to its slow pace and meager results. The World Trade Organization
(wto) has created a global framework of rules and a dispute settlement
system, but the commitment is nevertheless weak. Member states are
looking to regional agreements to create firmer foundations for their
economies to participate in global exchange. 
The Southern Cone countries have committed themselves to opening
up their trade, their economies have been restructured and they must
expand their markets to ensure sustainability for their export strategy.
The Treaty of Asunción constituted a reciprocal free trade agreement
which was conceived in addition as an instrument for building a common
market incorporating the economies of Southern countries at a relatively
similar stage of development. It differed from earlier attempts at integra-
tion in its universal approach (in contrast to lists of products). The aim is
to integrate in order to achieve growth and promote economic and social
development for the peoples of the member states. 
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The integration agreement was formulated around two major time
lines: the Trade Liberalization Program (tlp) and the Regime of Adap-
tation to mercosur (ram). These two instruments govern the process
of commercial integration, still the linchpin of the agreement. The tlp
dates back to the initial Treaty of 1991 and was the basis for creating the
Free Trade Area (fta). Intra-regional tariffs were gradually eliminated by
using a linear and automatic reduction scheme. This liberalization
scheme was announced in advance by the member countries’ govern-
ments and then carried out twice a year on a regular basis, as envisaged at
the outset. Its rigorous implementation makes it a model specimen of
public policy adopted by the member countries. 
The second instrument, the ram, emerged from the Ouro Preto sum-
mit of December 1994. It was set up to finalize the Free Trade Area as the
Trade Liberalization Program was reaching completion. However, this
new instrument broadened the terms of liberalization, slowing down the
construction process of the Free Trade Zone. A new list of products ex-
cluded from the intra-regional free trade was defined. Now that the
schedule laid down for these ram lists has been fulfilled, the integration
agreement can be described as a universal, non-tariff, free trade zone with
a degree of harmonization in terms of trading policies adopted towards
third parties.
It was also at the Ouro Preto summit of 1994 that the members of the
trade agreement adopted a Customs Union (cu) format. To begin with,
agreement was reached on a basic structure for the Common External
Tariff (cet), along with a convergence schedule for sectors in which po-
litical preferences were still not congruent. However, 10 years after this
new direction was adopted, the cet has not yet established a common
structure. There are still exceptions for certain member countries and sec-
tors, unharmonized special trade regimes, there are no common trade de-
fense mechanisms and so many national differences remain. This highly
perforated cet system explains why rules of origin are still required for
goods traded within the region. Member countries are still applying dif-
ferent national policies to a major chunk of the tariff universe.
Economic Relevance in the Global Economy
Since mercosur was founded it has increasingly caught the attention of
the big players in the global economy (blocs, countries, international or-
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ganizations, private sector) that have different interests in this initiative
for a regional bloc of economies of the South. The strategy chosen by the
mercosur members for economic integration makes this an ambitious
venture. Its model is similar to the European format, developing through
a sequence of stages with increasingly close economic relations. More-
over, this region is primarily a magnet for the world economy due to its
relative abundance of natural resources. And finally, it constitutes a po-
tential market which could attract global interest if it manages to steer a
course of stable growth.
If we assess the significance of the Southern Cone bloc by looking at
how it has performed in respect of three parameters (production, trade,
and foreign direct investment), however, we obtain a more differentiated
picture, enabling us to place the above in a broader perspective (Baraibar
and Vaillant, 2004). First, we can study mercosur’s performance be-
tween the end of the 1980s (1990) and 2003 (thus using the most recently
available annual statistics). Moreover, mercosur’s performance can be
compared with that of other trade blocs: the Andean Community, the
North American Free Trade Area (nafta), the European Union of
15 member states (eu-15), and the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (asean). These blocs were chosen because they combine two
criteria: their importance to the world economy and their importance to
mercosur. 
With regard to production, momentum was lower than for the world
economy as a whole and this is reflected by a decline in mercosur’s share
of global production. In the period under review the economic weight of
the bloc decreased, from 2.6 percent in the early 1990s to 2.0 percent in
the last three years considered (2001–2003) (see figure 1).
Looking at global trade patterns, the five trade blocs account for two-
thirds of international trade. Half this trade is intra-regional, with a
mostly upward trend in the period under review. With regard to merco-
sur, trade within the bloc increased in line with the integration process
(reaching about 20 percent), but it remains low compared with other
blocs (less than half the average for the five blocs as a whole). These sta-
tistics illustrate how the integration process is advancing.  
If we consider imports, the region’s share of world trade fell, from
1.4 percent in 1995 to less than 1.0 percent in 2003. As regards exports, on
the other hand, the growth rate was slightly higher than for world trade
as a whole between 1995 and 2003, when the share of world exports rose
from 0.9 percent to 1.0 percent. In both cases trade share was noticeably
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lower than share of production, reflecting the fact that the region is rela-
tively closed compared with the world economy as a whole. In 2003 glo-
bal trade was 22 percent of global production, while for mercosur the
figure was 10.5 percent for imports and 17 percent for exports of regional
production (see figure 2). 
The 1990s brought rocketing international capital movements. In
1990 global foreign direct investment (fdi) flows were about four times
as high as those registered in 1980. The eu and nafta countries were the
principal destinations. Investment in blocs in the South focused initially
on asean, where the fdi inflow in 1990 was six times higher than in 1980,
and on the Andean Community, where it trebled over the same period.
mercosur showed similar values, but the increasing flow into the region
did not begin until later. The formal launch of the agreement in 1991 co-
incided with a substantial inward flow of fdi. In 1995 inward fdi was
three times as high as in 1990, and in 2000 it was four times the total for
1995. One factor which boosted the bloc’s ability to attract this investment
and explains what has been called the »fdi boom« (Chudnovsky, 2001)
were the privatizations initiated by governments in the region. Towards
Figure 1: 
Trade Bloc Shares of Global Production (%)
Source: based on data from Baraibar and Vaillant (2004). ac = Andean Com-
munity. row = rest of the world.
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the end of the period for which statistics are available (2003) a decline set
in, although the volume never dropped to the levels seen prior to the in-
tegration agreement (see table 1). 
In 2003 the region accounted for a somewhat higher share of global
fdi (1.9 percent) than of global production (1.7 percent), whereas in 1990
share of global production was larger (2.6 percent) and the capacity to at-
tract fdi considerably lower (0.5 percent). This is one of the few areas in
which the bloc’s role in the world economy is substantiated by real eco-
nomic data.
A degree of caution is required, however, because fdi is increasingly
focusing on Brazil. Table 1 demonstrates this eloquently. This gain in
share by the largest country in the bloc is not merely a new phenomenon
associated with the recent crisis (notably in Argentina), but the result of
a more far-reaching process which has been going on since the outset, a
trend which should sound an alarm with regard to the outcome of the in-
tegration process. We shall examine these matters in the following sec-
tion. 
Figure 2: 
International Trade as Percentage of Production (GDP) in 2003
Source: based on data from Baraibar and Vaillant (2004).
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Benefits of Regional Integration and Obstacles 
to Full Economic Integration
The first and fairly obvious benefit which the mercosur countries have
derived from integration is preferential access to a larger market. A simple
quantification of the differentiated impact of this for member countries
is comparison of the size of the region – excluding the country concerned
– with the size of the country itself. Among other things this shows the
great asymmetry between members: in the case of Brazil, the populations
of the other countries, and hence the market they represent, amount to
only about one-third of its own. For Uruguay, on the other hand, with
its low density of population, the other countries constitute a market 64.6
times the size of its own. If production is our measure, Paraguay finds it-
self in a region almost 124 times as big as its own economy. Argentina is
in an intermediate position by comparison with its fellow members:
while the bloc gives it access to an economy several times larger than its
own (almost three times for production and nearly five times for popu-
lation), it is not as small as Paraguay or Uruguay, in respect of which the
size of the regional market is overwhelming. 
One necessity facing the three smaller members (Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay) is the opportunity to sell their products to the rest of the
world. Small economies have specialized structures, producing large
quantities of only a few products and consuming small quantities of
many products. This specialization can be related to a certain external vul-
nerability, given that the country will be bound by the access require-
Table 1: 
FDI into MERCOSUR Countries: 
Annual Average for the Period (US $ Million)
Period/
Country
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCO-
SUR
1990–1993 2 763 1 361 93 68 4 285
1994–1997 6 229 9 429 155 144 15 957
1998–2001 10 966 28 168 157 248 39 538
2002–2003 632 13 367 47 219 14 264
Source: from unctad database as cited in Baraibar and Vaillant (2004).
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ments of the markets they are specializing in. The products in respect of
which the minor mercosur countries enjoy conventional competitive
advantages face international markets which can be difficult to enter.
External vulnerability can be reduced if the size of the market that can be
accessed under free trade conditions is bigger, broadening the range of
products and services in which a country can specialize.
The three smaller MERCOSUR countries have not yet profited from 
joining a larger market.
For small economies, therefore, economic integration is another in-
strument for surmounting the constraints of their restricted domestic
market. Modern manufacturing technology means that economies of
scale play a dominant role in competitiveness. When the scale is bigger
(or when more is produced), production costs per unit fall. International
trade makes it possible to exploit these efficiency gains. Comparison in-
dicates that regional integration plays a central role in this process.
However, the three smaller mercosur countries have not yet profited
from joining a larger market. For Argentina and Uruguay, integration
brought with it a loss of their share in mercosur’s industrial production
during the first phase. A number of recent papers have documented this
phenomenon for Argentina (Sanguinetti, Triastaru and Volpe, 2003) and
Uruguay (Labraga and Lalanne, 2004). Table 2 shows how the countries
with which we are concerned have evolved as a manufacturing base over
a longer period, confirming this effect.3
Economic integration has displayed two essential characteristics which
explain the poor industrial performance of the bloc’s three smaller econ-
omies: 
i. The abolition of import tariffs on intra-regional trade by and large fol-
lowed a previously announced schedule. Non-tariff barriers (ntb),
however, were not eliminated with the same efficiency, and these con-
tinued to influence intra-regional trade. The existence of non-tariff
3. The phenomenon must also be examined at subregional level within the countries
concerned, especially in the case of the two geographically larger members. This
permits more accurate comparisons in assessing the development of agglomerated
industrial centers within the bloc and how their evolution relates to the progress of
integration (Terra and Vaillant, 2000).
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barriers acts as an incentive to locate investment and production in the
big market. This is due in part to the direct effect they have on prices
and in part to the uncertainty they create about future results. The
damage caused by barriers is not only direct, due to the way they ham-
per trade flows, but also indirect, because of the likelihood that future
barriers might be imposed on current location decisions.
ii. Although the bloc opted for a customs union format, 10 years after the
Ouro Preto Protocol it continues to operate like a free trade area when
it comes to the rules governing circulation of goods within the inte-
grated zone. The only goods to which preferential customs treatment
is applied in intra-regional trade are those considered native under the
current Rules of Origin (ro). The consequences are considerable in
terms of the ability to attract industrial processes to small market econ-
omies, which have a low level of vertical integration in their industrial
structure. It has been demonstrated that the Rules of Origin stimulate
demand for and translate into higher prices for regional inputs. Small
economies, which could offer advantages in shorter production
chains, are unable to develop this specialization in the current scenario.
Indeed, they are prevented from doing so because if goods are not na-
tive, even if they comply with common trade policy (Common Exter-
nal Tariff and common preferential regime for third parties), the tariff
must be paid again as soon as the goods cross another border within
the region.
Table 2: 
Manufacturing GDP in MERCOSUR (US $ Million at 1995 Values and %)
1980–1982 1990–1992 2000–2002
US $ 
million
% US $ 
million
% US $ 
million
%
Argentina 36 350 22.9 36 507 22.3 39 440 20.5
Brazil 117 415 74.1 121 986 74.6 148 008 77.1
Paraguay 991 0.6 1 218 0.7 1 300 0.7
Uruguay 3 798 2.4 3 772 2.3 3 207 1.7
mercosur 158 554 100.0 163 483 100.0 191 955 100.0
Source: author’s calculations based on eclac data (Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Carribean).
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In other words, the existence of ntb and the continued application of the
ro to the full customs universe have left the elimination of hurdles and
restrictions to intra-regional trade stranded halfway in terms of exploiting
the integration potential. 
During the 1990s, the trade bloc made progress towards abolishing
tariffs. Today, however, tariffs offer an incomplete yardstick and tell us
little about the difficulties still being posed by market access. Zignago and
Mayer (2004) have therefore estimated the explanatory power of borders
by studying the extent to which domestic production is favored as against
production from the rest of the world. The results for the 1990s show that
on average in the world economy, a country buys 273 times more from
itself than it would buy from any other country when the control vari-
ables (market size, distance, tariffs, and so on) are similar. There are dif-
ferences, however, between North–North trade, with a ratio of 130, and
South–South trade, with a ratio of 327! If countries have a preferential
trade agreement, this border effect coefficient is reduced to 42. The result
is clear: preferential trade agreements diminish border effects substan-
tially for the regions examined in this analysis. This also applies to the
four countries of mercosur, although the border effect coefficient
within the bloc (120) is still considerable (by comparison: the ratio for the
eu is 47, for Canadian–us trade 52, and for asean 81. Only the Andean
Community has even stronger border effects, with a ratio of 330). 
Zignago and Mayer (2004) also conducted a longitudinal analysis of
changes in border effects in the world economy as a whole and region by
region. They demonstrate a declining tendency, especially within the
framework of regional trading agreements. The two blocs that have
proved most successful in reducing border-related fragmentation are the
European Union and nafta. In the regional structure composed by our
four Southern economies, the border effect fell noticeably in the 1990s,
but it remains high.
Geographical trade models which specify the complex interaction be-
tween economies of scale, transport costs and market size show that the
level of industrialization of peripheral economies (those which are not
within industrial heartlands) forms an irregular U-curve when set against
the depth of integration achieved (Krugman and Venables, 1990). When
levels of integration are very low, industry is spatially dispersed; as inte-
gration proceeds, strong incentives emerge to concentrate manufacturing
where market size is greater. If integration progresses effectively, econo-
mies that were once peripheral come closer to the industrial core, thereby
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increasing their capacity to retain manufacturing activity on their terri-
tory.4 Consequently, if economic integration has led to deindustrializa-
tion in the smaller, more peripheral economies of mercosur, this is not
due to high but to low integration. To the extent that regional integration
has only managed to advance a few first steps, it has exacerbated the neg-
ative bias against manufacturing locations in smaller economies, as the
theoretical literature predicts (the U-shaped pattern).
Negotiating with Third Parties: Projects and Problems
As already mentioned, mercosur is an agreement with ambitious goals
for economic integration. The trading strategy it adopted was a Customs
Union format. The cu is not often used in the global economy when set-
ting up preferential trading agreements because it is associated with a
greater degree of commitment among member countries to developing
common policies and institutions.5 There are a number of explicit reasons
why this format was selected. One has already been described and relates
to the fact that this model of preferential agreement permits more inten-
sive regional integration, ultimately eliminating Rules of Origin and
thereby permitting a more universal circulation of intra-regional trade.
The other motive frequently cited is that a cu strengthens the region’s
hand when negotiating with third parties because this integration model
calls for a common trade policy. 
The comparative advantages of the four mercosur countries are
heavily weighted towards goods with an intensive input of natural
resources. These are the productive factors which the Southern Cone
boasts in abundance. Many of the sectors concerned have problems ac-
cessing the international market, especially the big industrialized mar-
kets. There is a close correlation between the comparative advantages the
bloc can offer and the protectionist core of trade policies adopted by the
wealthy nations. This is especially evident in the case of agricultural food
4. Terra and Vaillant 2000 calibrated the center-periphery model for the economic ge-
ography of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay and in simulations with low
and average levels of integration they obtained results of this type for the smaller
countries in the bloc.
5. Of the 215 current regional trade agreements, only 14 have been notified to the wto
as customs unions (omc, 2003).
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products, but not confined to them. The regional integration initiative
could be regarded as an instrument for correcting this unequal access to
the global economy. 
As the previous chapter showed, the member countries display a low
dynamism compared to other regions, reflected in the aggregated figures
for production and trade. The situation is equally worrying when we
undertake a more specific comparison. If we consider the relative perfor-
mance of manufacturing output compared with the other countries of
Latin America, we will note that the Treaty countries come up with
negative values. Table 3 illustrates this decline by comparing the share of
industrial production for the three-year period at the beginning of three
successive decades. The fastest growing countries were Chile and Mexico,
where industrial output rose fastest, and their record is particularly strik-
ing when set against Argentina and Brazil (see table 2). This may partly
be explained by their success in negotiations with third parties, especially
the dynamic industrialized economies of the North. 
Obtaining better terms of access to the markets of industrialized coun-
tries is a priority, and indeed a strategic necessity in sustaining the model
of trade liberalization and export-driven growth adopted by the merco-
Table 3: 
Manufacturing Production in Latin America 
(US $ Million at 1995 Values and %)
1980–1982 1990–1992 2000–2002
US $ 
million
% US $ 
million
% US $ 
million
%
mercosur 158 554 61.6 163 483 58.1 191 955 54.7
Chile 6 746 2.6 9 908 3.5 14 520 4.1
ac 30 773 12.0 33 382 11.9 36 134 10.3
mcca 6 063 2.4 6 883 2.4 10 298 2.9
Mexico 55 134 21.4 67 835 24.1 98 209 28.0
total 257 270 100.0 281 490 100.0 351 117 100.0
Notes: ac – Andean Community; mcca – Central American Common 
Market.
Source: author’s calculations based on data from eclac.
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sur countries from the 1990s onward. Opening up trade implies replac-
ing inefficient domestic production with production from the rest of the
world offered at a better quality and price. It is vital, therefore, to ensure
that the productive resources no longer required as a consequence of this
are channeled into domestic activities that promise greater relative effi-
ciency. If these favorable sectors then encounter problems of global mar-
ket access, the liberalization model will be constrained in its progress and
limited in its sustainability.
There is a link between the beneficial effects of negotiating trade con-
ditions with third parties and the ability to establish a unified market. If
there is a common trade policy,6 it will be easier to express a negotiating
position. If there is merely an intention to adopt a common trade policy
but it has not yet been fully implemented, or even made to function par-
tially, this will mitigate the potential for deriving national or collective ad-
vantages from joint negotiations with third parties. 
Joint negotiations of mercosur members with third parties have de-
veloped vigorously over the last 10 years, but the results have frankly been
meager. Joint preferential agreements were struck very quickly with Chile
and Bolivia, but a joint agreement with the Andean Community was only
concluded in 2004. It is evident that this latter agreement will face serious
implementation problems. Further negotiation scenarios have prolifer-
ated, but any significant talks have foundered or been suspended. Many
factors have contributed to this outcome, but one which cannot be ig-
nored is the region’s own inability to progress towards a common trade
policy, which would include as one of its constituent elements a clear ne-
gotiating position for each of the areas described above.
It is particularly worth noting what happened in trade negotiations
with the European Union. Negotiations between the eu and mercosur,
which were initiated in 1999 after ratification of the Interregional Frame-
work Agreement geared towards the creation of an Interregional Associ-
ation, led to the formation of several committees with the aim of reaching
agreement on political, commercial, and cooperation issues (Arcuri and
Vaillant, 2004). However, the strategy developed by both parties is based
6. There are various components in a common trade policy. The salient ones are: a
classification system for common goods; similar customs valuation systems, which
normally requires a common customs code; a common external tariff; shared trade
defense rules (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, protective clauses); a similar preferential
trade scheme for third markets; harmonized or shared special trade regimes.
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on different and contrasting views. mercosur is attempting to improve
access – particularly for agricultural products – to the European market,
which underlines a systemic approach and leads to conditions being im-
posed on the continuation of the negotiations, currently based on a lib-
eralization offer perceived by mercosur as asymmetric. The eu wants
to be sure that it can count on definite trade norms, including customs
issues as well as trade in services, investment, government procurement,
intellectual property, and sustainable development. The eu also regards
it as necessary to establish clear rules with respect to free circulation
within the mercosur countries, harmonization of customs norms, and
a trustworthy system of conflict resolution. In order to achieve this, a ne-
gotiation process in two phases was proposed, which should begin with
the question of norms, and continuing with negotiations on market ac-
cess, including a better mercosur offer regarding custom duties.
We can observe a shift in direction on the part of Brazil towards an 
option which privileges South–South negotiations, especially within 
South America, as a substitute for trade negotiations with the econo-
mies of the North.
More than any other talks, these offered mercosur an opportunity to
enhance its own agreement by joining a process of integration with a
third party. This is not a trade agreement which waters down existing
preferences (as might be the case with the Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas, ftaa, in an American context), but it does require mercosur to
function as a Customs Union. It is actually one of the few global precur-
sors of bloc-to-bloc associations of this kind. Given the integrated nature
of this association, which goes beyond the trade link to include political
and cooperation aspects, the agreement with the European Union stands
out as an ideal proposal to enable the bloc to profit from the technology
of economic integration which the eu can be claimed without any exag-
geration to have invented. 
Unfortunately, on this count again the balance is negative. Broadly
speaking, since mercosur was launched in the early 1990s, not a single
trade negotiation of any significance has been concluded with third mar-
kets. Some thought should be given to why the record on external nego-
tiation has been so poor. One factor already mentioned is the slow
progress of the Customs Union. However, deeper causes must be sought
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which might relate to the true policy preferences of member states, in par-
ticular Brazil, rather than those currently being expressed openly.
Generally, we can observe a shift in direction on the part of Brazil to-
wards an option which privileges South–South negotiations, especially
within South America, as a substitute for trade negotiations with the
economies of the North. This attitude does not hold out particularly good
prospects for future consolidation of the Customs Union: first, given the
concrete economic relevance such agreements can have, besides the objec-
tives they may be pursuing in terms of international relations, and sec-
ondly given that many of them highlight the erratic or incomplete func-
tioning of the Customs Union and do not qualify as joint preferential
agreements. The format they need in order to be politically acceptable
makes them the worst possible agreements from an economic perspective.
Hopes have been expressed more recently in relation to the agree-
ments with India and China. It would be wrong to talk of irrelevance, but
it can be argued that they do not appear to be the kind of trade agree-
ments likely to further the bloc’s joint functioning. Moreover, there are
no well-founded reasons for believing that mercosur’s bargaining posi-
tion will be any better when dealing with these highly populous, distant
Asian nations than with an integrated Europe, with which the Southern
Cone has long, continuous historical ties, political, economic, and cul-
tural. Brazil is the country with the most reservations about signing
agreements with the industrialized nations, but it is also the country
which stands to gain the biggest markets and to benefit from increased
bargaining power provided by joint negotiations.
It is clear that the difficulties encountered by the bloc in negotiating
with the industrialized world are not all of their own making. While mer-
cosur may be a small fish in the global pond, it remains the biggest re-
gional economic player in Latin America. The industrialized nations,
both American and European, have come to the negotiating table with a
broad, all-embracing agenda, but with trade offers which any sober ob-
server is bound to describe as unacceptable. In those sectors in which the
industrialized nations have a clear interest, the objective is total liberaliza-
tion based on general rules, but when they want to defend particular sec-
tors there is no limit to their particularism. It is logical that the domestic
political elites within the Southern bloc, especially within its largest
member, do not favor trade negotiations in this vein.
In a recent book, Lorenzo and Vaillant (2004) argued with regard to
the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ftaa) that strength-
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ening the case for liberalization depends on the groups who will benefit
from increased exports and investments in outside markets. Their ability
to put pressure on their home government depends critically on the scope
for improving access to their trading partners’ markets. The industrial-
ized countries have the option of pursuing an active policy to push for
liberalization in an emerging market where a particular sector or focus
attracts their interest, and making significant concessions in their own
market in sectors where the Southern bloc can clearly benefit. This will
strengthen the alliance of pro-agreement exporters in the South, encour-
aging liberalization and causing their markets to open up. In the case an-
alyzed by Lorenzo and Vaillant (2004), it will be difficult for the United
States to improve its access to markets for electronics, high tech and
capital goods if it is not prepared to make significant concessions at the
core of its protectionist structure for agriculture and traditional manufac-
turing. What goes for the bigger partner certainly goes for the Southern
bloc and emphasizes the relevance of the domestic factor in international
negotiations.
Conclusions
The 1991 Treaty of Asunción constituted a reciprocal initiative towards
trade liberalization, additionally conceived as an instrument for building
a Common Market, undertaken by economies of the South at similar lev-
els of development. Since it was founded it has increasingly caught the
attention of the major players in the global economy. However, the only
conspicuous impact that the bloc has made on the global economy de-
rives from its capacity to attract fdi, although there has been a continu-
ous trend towards geographical concentration within the bloc, favoring
Brazil as its largest member.
In a context of asymmetric market size, gradual integration generates
strong disparities in the industrial location of manufacturing activities.
The present situation therefore poses a choice between moving ahead and
turning back. Moving ahead means greater integration. This option in-
evitably entails a deeper commitment and the creation of common insti-
tutions capable of managing, among other things, the two issues de-
scribed earlier: non-tariff barriers and rules of origin in intra-regional
trade. These have both acted as a brake on the intensification of economic
integration. Turning back would require the smaller economies to adopt
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defensive measures to stem the tide of concentration in the largest coun-
try, reducing the level of integration.
At the same time, a process of broadening mercosur is under way.
The majority of the countries in South America are either integrated into
the bloc or else associate members or candidates.7 Negotiations about
free trade agreements between the bloc and several other states or regions
are also on track. One cannot be sure whether a joint preferential trade
agreement with another country or bloc will be a substitute for pressing
ahead towards a fully fledged mercosur trade agreement. One might ex-
pect, to take the reverse approach, that a joint trade policy ought to be a
basic requirement for any joint trade agreement. In that sense one might
expect there to be a positive complementary relationship between broad-
ening the base and setting up new agreements on the one hand and deep-
ening the structure of the present regional agreement on the other. To
bring that about, however, real joint agreements have to be concluded
with third parties, and one critical factor here is doubtless the kind of
partner one should choose.
It is not clear whether the current approach to broadening the bloc and
extending relations with third markets will strengthen relations between
the four members in a manner which will enable them to resolve the var-
ious problems preventing proper functioning of the trade agreement.
Furthermore, the characteristics of these essentially South–South agree-
ments encourage a certain pessimism about their ability to promote a
functioning Customs Union, although they could certainly help the re-
gion to exert greater political influence in the global arena. Even so, one
cannot tell how this greater political influence might translate into more
favorable conditions regarding issues of concern to the region in partic-
ular and the South in general. The history of these new relations is too
brief to allow an informed judgment.
mercosur trade agreements with industrialized economies signify
improved market access for products of interest, thus realizing the bene-
fits of joint negotiation. In addition, however, they pave the way to in-
tensifying the commitment of the four member countries in that they are
obliged to apply stricter rules to implementing their regional trade agree-
ment. Negotiations with both the United States (via the ftaa or bilater-
7. Chile, Bolivia, and Peru are associate members and Venezuela has asked to become
one. To be an associate member, the country must enter into a universal trade agree-
ment with the bloc (Free Trade Area).
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ally) and the European Union are fundamental. In particular, a possible
agreement with Europe could, more than any other, encourage the bloc
to function more effectively as a Customs Union. But negotiating with
the North is not easy, for the wide-ranging gains facilitated by these
agreements are associated with a complex and adverse political economy
which can be overcome only with a great deal of political will and leader-
ship on both sides.
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